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Abstract. This article presents a methodology designed to facilitate alternative 
variables measuring economic growth.  A capital-labor split of Cobb-Douglas 
function is adapted for use in the context of economic growth.  A 
capital/income ratio and two fundamental laws of capitalism originated by 
Thomas Piketty illustrate capital inequality undervalued with respect to labor 
inequality.  In addition, the article includes export and external debt as strong 
alternatives.  Empirical data of the World Bank are analyzed to demonstrate 
broad differences in economic sizes.  The case analysis on Latin America as 
an example of different sized economy is also discussed. 
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Introduction  
 
Questions about stability of the capital-labor split 
 
“ …..in the 2000s several official reports published by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) took note of the phenomenon (a sign 
that the question was being taken seriously).  The novelty of this study is that it is to my knowledge the 
first attempt to place the question of the capital-labor split and the recent increase of capital’s share of 
national income in a broader historical context by focusing on the evolution of the capital/income ratio 
from the eighteenth century until now. ….. ” 
 Ref: Thomas Piketty (2014) Capital in the Twenty-First Century 
 
      Until when, can we use the Cobb-Douglas function with the mindset to believe 
the stability of the Capital-Labor split?  A rational answer with alternative solutions 
should be pursued to this question.  At the first step, we may comment on weakness 
of this method.   
      Firstly, the Solow residual which is a number describing empirical productivity 
growth in an economy from year to year and decade to decade is hard to be calculated 
because of its "residual" which is the part of growth that cannot be explained through 
capital accumulation or the accumulation of other traditional factors, such as land or 
labor.  
      The equation in Cobb-Douglas form is: Y=A K
 
L

 where total output Y is as a 
function of total-factor productivity A, Capital input K, Labor input L and two input's 
respective shares of output. ( and  are the capital input share of contribution for K 
and L respectively) 
      Even though Robert Solow defined rising productivity as rising output with 
constant capital and labor input perfectly, he left undefined part as the Solow residual. 
The problem is that Solow residual has pro-cyclicality.  Traditionally, total output is 
measured by inputs of labor and capital.  TFP (TFP) called multi-factor productivity 
(MFP) accounting for all inputs cannot be measured directly and accounts for effects 
in total output not caused by inputs.  Indeed, there are two sided directions to analyze 
the economy.   
      Especially, Multifactor Productivity (MFP) is measured as below: 
 
MFPi = Yi - i where Yi denotes actual output and i denotes predicted output    (1a)  
Loge (Y) = 0 + I loge (i) + I loge (Li)                                  (1b) 
 
      So we get, MFP = (ln)/t = (lnY)/t – sL(lnL)/t - sK(lnK)/t where 
 is the global production function: Y is output, t is time, SL is the share of input costs 
attributable to labor expenses, SK is the share of input costs attributable to capital 
expenses, L is a dollar quantity of labor, K is a dollar quantity of capital, M is a dollar 
quantity of materials, S is a dollar quantity of (business) services, E is energy or 
exergy (available energy), only used in some models. 
      Secondly, like Total Factor Productivity (TFP), Growth accounting exercises 
are open to the Cambridge Critique.  The aggregation problem is the major part of 
this debate.  The style that the representative agent solves the decision problem in the 
function assuming the entire economy cannot be from the debate about the collection 
problem of different inputs, sudden shocks, rate of profit and a large number of 
heterogeneous workplaces.  Hence, some economists believe that the method and its 
results are invalid.   
      Otherwise, we can indirectly establish the model to find determinants of TFP.  
Neoclassical economics started with the classical factors of production of land, labor 
and capital.  Further distinctions from classical and neoclassical microeconomics 
include capital-the result of investment, fixed capital, working capital, financial capital 
and technological progress.  Additionally, entrepreneurship, human capital, 
intellectual capital, social capital, natural resources and energy can be considered. 
 
 
 
 
 
                    Table 1: Methodology about Factors of Production 
 
Inputs: Three Factors of Production 
Classical economics Adam Smith, David Ricardo: Labor, Capital Stock, Land (Natural Resource) 
Marxism Labor, The subject of labor, The instruments of labor 
Neoclassical microeconomics different format: Capital, Fixed Capital, Working Capital, 
Financial Capital, Technological progress 
+add: Entrepreneurs (Frank Knight), Human Capital, Intellectual Capital, Social Capital (Pierre 
Bourdieu), Natural resources (Ayres-Warr), Energy 
Output: Finished Goods (National Income) 
Factor Payments: Rent, Wage, Interest, Profit 
Ref: author, 2014 
 
      So we need to think "Weightiness" on Labor, Capital and other factors at the 
next step.  I agree with the opinion of Thomas Piketty that structure of inequality 
with respect to both labor and capital has actually changed since the ninetieth century. 
 
      “To what extent are inequalities of income from labor moderate, reasonable, or even no longer 
an issue today?  It is true that inequalities with respect to labor are always much smaller than 
inequalities with respect to capital.  It would be quite wrong, however, to neglect them, first because 
income from labor generally accounts for two-thirds to three-quarters of national income, and second 
because there are quite substantial differences between countries in the distribution of income from 
labor, which suggests that public policies and national differences can have major consequences for 
these inequalities and for the living conditions of large numbers of people.” 
Ref: Thomas Piketty (2014) Capital in the Twenty-First Century 
 
Dynamics of the capital/income ratio of Thomas Piketty: r > g 
 
“…If, moreover, the rate of return on capital remains significantly above the growth rate for an 
extended period of time (which is more likely when the growth rate is low, though not automatic), then 
the risk of divergence in the distribution of wealth is very high...” 
“…This fundamental inequality, which I will write as r > g (where r stands for the average annual rate 
of return on capital, including profits, dividends, interest, rents, and other income from capital, 
expressed as a percentage of its total value, and g stands for the rate of growth of the economy, that is, 
the annual increase in income or output), will play a crucial role in this book.  In a sense, it sums up 
the overall logic of  my conclusions.….”  
Ref: Thomas Piketty (2014) Capital in the Twenty-First Century 
 
Thomas Piketty put emphasis on capital inequality.  This is the similar viewpoint of 
boom and bust.  Boom and bust are periods of a severe business cycle over time.  
Several economic indicators are denoted as sustained increases followed by a sharp 
and rapid contraction.  Times of increased business and investment have collapsed 
leaving widespread poverty such as the depression of 1837 and 1857 in the United 
States.  For example, in the early 1800s in Ohio people were buying land on credit to 
sell at twice the price but land became too expensive to buy.  At the same time, wheat 
prices became too low to transport wheat to market.  Wheat was $1.50 per bushel in 
1816; by 1821, 20 cents.  The automaker Paul Hoffman said “we cannot live with a 
crash with 26 depressions over 100 years including the burst of the 1930s.” 
      The dynamics of the capital/income ratio adds a new perspective to the debate 
on capital and wealth.  Previous study provides an overview of economic 
development.  The direction of economic growth rate should increase to the top.  
However, the new viewpoint offers an alternative framework to demonstrate how the 
society actually moves.  It examines different meanings of changes and directions 
with regard of economic growth.  The attempt to be escaped by the required bilateral 
choice between capital and labor re-illuminates on alternative factors to research 
economic growth. 
The First Fundamental Law of Capitalism α = r × β 
 
With the aid of exploration of capital induced from national income, the first law of 
capitalism attempts to show visible motion of dynamics.  It requires the fully-fledged 
account of global data because the formula produces the global interpretation without 
constraints.  In the left side of formula, α can be added and in the right side of 
formula, r × β can be added.  Hence, broader context with global empirical data is 
somewhat limited.    
  
“In order to illustrate the difference between short-term and long-term movements of the capital/income 
ratio, it is useful to examine the annual changes observed in the wealthiest countries between 1970 and 
2010, a period for which we have reliable and homogeneous data for a large number of countries.  To 
begin, here is a look at the ratio of private capital to national income, whose evolution is shown in 
Figure 5.3 for the eight richest countries in the world, in order of decreasing GDP: the United States, 
Japan, Germany, France, Britain, Italy, Canada, and Australia.” “ Figure 5.3 (figure 1 in the paper as 
below) displays annual series and shows that the capital/income ratio in all countries varied constantly 
in the very short run. ” 
 “…. can now present the first fundamental law of capitalism, which links the capital stock to the flow 
of income from capital.  The capital/income ratio β is related in a simple way to the share of income 
from capital in national income, denoted α. The formula is α = r × β, where r is the rate of return on 
capital. …” 
Ref: Thomas Piketty (2014) Capital in the Twenty-First Century 
 
       The first law of capitalism offers a subjective view of capital to focus on 
deviation of bilateral choice between capital and labor.  Further evidence of the 
authenticity of the text is needed.     
       In the figure 1 (as below), the slope is upward in the end. It implies i
nterpretation whether long-run or short-run economy is possible.  However, dep
ending on the date of the World Bank as below, it’s impossible to explain abo
ut capital formation except for data of China.  China has the highest gross cap
ital formation (% of gross domestic production (GDP)) from 2004 to 2013.  
Indeed, this level is higher than the world’s one.  France, Germany, United Sta
tes and Japan’s graphs are similar except for China’s one. 
 
Figure 1 : Private Capital in Rich Countries, 1970-2010 
  
                                  Ref: piketty.pse.ens.fr/capital21c 
       In the figure 2 (as below), gross capital formation (formerly gross domestic 
investment) consists of outlays on additions to the fixed assets of the economy plus net 
changes in the level of inventories.  Fixed assets include land improvements (fences, 
ditches, drains, and so on); plant, machinery, and equipment purchases; and the 
construction of roads, railways, and the like, including schools, offices, hospitals, 
private residential dwellings, and commercial and industrial buildings. Inventories are 
stocks of goods held by firms to meet temporary or unexpected fluctuations in 
production or sales, and "work in progress."  According to the 1993 SNA, net 
acquisitions of valuables are also considered capital formation. 
  
                     Figure 2 : Gross Capital Formation (% of gross domestic production (GDP)) 
               
Ref : World Bank national accounts data and OECD National Accounts data files, May, 2014 
       The first law of capitalism gives fresh impetus to emphasize the role of 
capital to promote economic growth.  It should be elaborated to describe the main 
features of dynamics related to global data for the possibility of wide cross-country 
comparison. 
 
The Second Fundamental Law of Capitalism: β = s / g 
 
“….In the long run, the capital/income ratio β is related in a simple and transparent way to the savings 
rate s and the growth rate g according to the following formula: β = s / g…..” 
Ref: Thomas Piketty (2014) Capital in the Twenty-First Century. 
 
Gauging the general applicability related to the income rate to the growth rate is 
investigated by similarity between each gross domestic production (GDP) motion of 
different countries and world average motion.   
      As below, there are graphs of correlation between countries’ gross domestic 
production (GDP) growths and the world’s one.  China has very different shapes of 
correlation with respect to the world’s one from other’s.  This example is to test the 
hypothesis of the second law of capitalism.  With the panoramic viewpoint of figure 
3, the argument is evidently to make explicit cross-sectional data of different countries 
and thus contrast various interpretations upon which to different approaches to the 
contemporary management of past built environments are based. 
  Figure 3 : Graphs of Correlation between Countries’ gross domestic production (GDP) Growths and 
the World’s One 
 
  
 
 
  
   
  Ref: author, 2014 
 
Gross domestic production (GDP) growth graphs of United Kingdom, United States, 
France, Germany, Japan, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain have similar upward 
tendencies.  China’s one looks like South Korea, Mexico, Argentina, Brazil and 
Chile.    
      In addition, in the long run, can the capital/income ratio β be reflected by the 
volatility of the savings rate s and the growth rate g ?  Within the context not to 
divide into countries depending on their economic sizes, then, we face aggregation 
problem.  This brief empirical test here is intended to provoke the case that 
outstanding values than averaged value in the long run can exist.  The second law of 
capitalism encapsulates the capital concern in general.  However, it initiates a 
discussion of the stabilization of dynamics and boundary of optimal values by the end.  
Hence, in this paper, I will endeavor to explore new variables which can affect the left 
side and right side in the law of capitalism by absorption.  
 
Economic Size and Debt Sustainability 
 
Trade condition  
 
Judging from stability of the capital-labor split, in the paper, attention was directed to 
the weightiness of capital and labor.  Two laws of Piketty’s capitalism have centered 
on the capital inequality within national income.  The main objective of arguments is 
to investigate the validity of global application because an idea of capital inequality 
takes economic growth as focal point.  In what follows, I explore key signifying 
variables.  I hope to look most closely at familiar economic variables from a global 
angle.   
       I shall start by an attempt to check the correlation between average value of 
world and each value of each country with regard to exports of goods and services, 
gross domestic production (GDP) growth, GDP per capital, gross national income 
(GNI) per capital purchasing power parity (PPP), Gross capital formation, Gross 
savings, foreign direct investment (FDI) and inflation consumer price.  What I 
propose to do here is to examine structural importance of key economic variables 
except for capital within world variables.  I will use these empirical data as a 
framework against which to understand the capital within national income.  I will 
concentrate on more rational way to address economic growth and capital inequality 
offering the global interpretation beyond the capital inequality framework within 
national income of Thomas Piketty.    
       Depend on data of World Bank, from 1970 to 2013, the correlation between 
world’s one and countries’ exports of goods and services is positive. (Observation 43) 
 
      Table 3.1 : Correlation between World’s One and Countries’ Exports of Goods and Services 
 
 
 
         From 1971 to 2012, among the correlation between world’s one and 
countries’ GDP growth, China and Argentine’s ones have negative values. 
(Observation 42)  
 
          Table 3.2 : Correlation between World’s One and Countries’ GDP Growth 
 
  
          From 1970 to 2013, the correlation between world’s one and countries’ 
GDP per capital is positive. (Observation 43)                                         
 
            Table 3.3 : Correlation between World’s One and Countries’ GDP per Capital 
 
 
      From 1980 to 2012, the correlation between world’s one and countries’ GNI 
per capital ppp is positive. (Observation 27)    
                                  
       Table 3.4 : Correlation between World’s One and Countries’ GNI per Capital PPP 
 
 
 
        From 1970 to 2013, the correlation between world’s one and countries’ gross 
capital formation is positive. (Observation 27)                            
 
          Table 3.5 : Correlation between World’s One and Countries’ Gross Capital Formation
 
 
          From 1970 to 2012, the correlation between world’s one and countries’ 
gross savings have negative value. (Observation 14)                            
 
          Table 3.6 : Correlation between World’s One and Countries’ Gross Savings 
 
 
 
     From 1961 to 2013, the correlation between world’s one and countries’ inflation 
consumer prices have negative value. (Observation 3)     
                        
      Table 3.8 : Correlation between World’s One and Countries’ Inflation Consumer Prices 
 
 
       From 1970 to 2012, the correlation between world’s one and countries’ FDI is 
no observation. 
 
         Table 3.7 : Correlation between World’s One and Countries’ FDI – no observation 
 
 
 
      Among the correlation with the world’s one, exports of goods and services, 
GDP per capital and gross capital formation have positive correlation value.  This is 
the reason why we need to focus on trade condition beyond no trade condition and 
complete market condition.  The attempt to identify the law of capitalism by Thomas 
Piketty draws together the bulk of the published neoclassical papers mainstreamed by 
French Economists.  I wish to flesh this out to take a highly microscopic approach to 
the question of economic growth.  I begin with a case analysis of Latin America 
animated by a curiosity about impact of export and debt problematizing sovereign 
credit to affect the sustainability of each country and the whole economy in general.     
       To deal with the global framework of capital inequality and economic growth, 
I turn to state export and debt sustainability in a series of ratio analysis of Thomas 
Piketty. I may say that capital inequality within national income will be articulated 
with ideas about external debt to export.  Having discussed empirical data, it is now 
time to focus on global activities beyond the domestic activities concerning 
sustainability of economic society. 
 
Export and Debt sustainability 
 
In case of debt sustainability, the debt to export criterion should be considered with the 
size of countries. (Roubini, N. 2001)  Suppose you have two countries, A and B that 
are identical. Their GDP is 100 each, their external debt is 50 each and their exports 
are 20 each.  Then the debt to GDP ratio is 50% for each and the debt to export ratio 
is 250% each.  Assume that, at this ratio, both countries are solvent.  Now take the 
two countries and merge them.  Total GDP will be 200, total debt will be 100 and 
total exports will be 20.  Roubini, N. (2001) mentioned this is because exports among 
each other are now inter-regional rather than international trade.  Hence, economic 
problems with no trade cannot be solved in reality.  
    By the end of this case, the combined A+B economy has a debt to GDP ratio 
that is still 50% but now the debt to export ratio is 500%, a figure that is clearly 
unsustainable and would suggest default.  
    Indeed, using the debt to export criterion, same two economies look solvent if 
they are a separate country and insolvent if they are joined in one country.  This 
suggests that the debt to export ratio may be a faulty measure of solvency; larger 
countries with greater intra-regional, rather than international trade, would look 
insolvent while smaller countries with similar fundamental would look solvent just 
because their export to GDP ratio is higher.  
    However, in the example, the export to GDP ratio is lower for a larger country 
with greater amount of inter-regional, rather than international trade.  But a small 
open economy, like Argentina, is usually more open than a larger economy; thus, low 
export to GDP ratio may reflect currency overvaluation, high degrees of trade 
protection and other policy restrictions to openness rather than structural factors that 
explain lower openness.  Thus, an economy that should be more open than it is and 
has a large debt to export ratio may find it harder to service its external debt.  For 
example, if export ratios are low, even a large real depreciation may not improve 
exports and trade balance enough to reduce a resource (trade balance) gap necessary to 
prevent insolvency.  So, the degree of openness (export to GDP ratio) within 
countries or beyond countries does affect country’s ability to service its debt.  
      As below, through the dickey fuller test - examines a unit root is present in an 
autogressive model, validity of variables can be detected more.  These data arranged 
yearly from 1970 to 2012 can be distinguished whether it has a unit root, a feature of 
processes that evolve through time that can cause problems in statistical inference.  
 
          Table 4 : Validity of Detectable Variables Checked by the Dickey Fuller Test 
 
dickey fuller test p-value Mexicogniperc 0.298 
Worldinfconsumerp 0.3432 Argentinagniperc 0.3281 
Chinainfconsumerp 0.0997 Brazilgniperc 0.3169 
United Kingdominfconsumerp 0.0351 Chilegniperc 0.267 
United Statesinfconsumerp 0.0279 Greecegniperc 0.0641 
Franceinfconsumerp 0.046 Irelandgniperc 0.2209 
Germanyinfconsumerp 0.0676 Italygniperc 0.0459 
Japaninfconsumerp 0.241 Portugalgniperc 0.5748 
Korea, Rep.infconsumerp 0.0657 Spaingniperc 0.115 
Mexicoinfconsumerp 0.0459 Worldgdpperc 0.5265 
Argentinainfconsumerp 0.0061 Chinagdpperc 0.1349 
Brazilinfconsumerp 0.1299 United Kingdomgdpperc 0.0888 
Chileinfconsumerp 0.4592 United Statesgdpperc 0.0062 
Greeceinfconsumerp 0.5022 Francegdpperc 0.3853 
Irelandinfconsumerp 0.3117 Germanygdpperc 0.5728 
Italyinfconsumerp 0 Japangdpperc 0.1964 
Portugalinfconsumerp 0.3045 Korea, Rep.gdpperc 0.0356 
Spaininfconsumerp 0.2629 Mexicogdpperc 0.298 
Worldgsaving 0.4606 Argentinagdpperc 0.2843 
Chinagsaving 0.7955 Brazilgdpperc 0.3086 
United Kingdomgsaving 0.2142 Chilegdpperc 0.267 
United Statesgsaving 0.0053 Greecegdpperc 0.0641 
Francegsaving 0.099 Irelandgdpperc 0.2209 
Germanygsaving 0.2228 Italygdpperc 0.0459 
Japangsaving 0.4214 Portugalgdpperc 0.0484 
Korea, Rep.gsaving 0.1076 Spaingdpperc 0.0193 
Mexicogsaving 0.014 Worldgdpg 0.0031 
Argentinagsaving 0.0041 Chinagdpg 0 
Brazilgsaving 0.0093 United Kingdomgdpg 0.0023 
Chilegsaving 0.0009 United Statesgdpg 0.0104 
Greecegsaving 0.0184 Francegdpg 0.0234 
Irelandgsaving 0.0006 Germanygdpg 0.227 
Italygsaving 0 Japangdpg 0.0099 
Portugalgsaving 0.0619 Korea, Rep.gdpg 0.0125 
Spaingsaving 0 Mexicogdpg 0.0041 
Worldgcf 0 Argentinagdpg 0 
Chinagcf 0.6332 Brazilgdpg 0.017 
United Kingdomgcf 0.0827 Chilegdpg 0.1073 
United Statesgcf 0.0176 Greecegdpg 0 
Francegcf 0.0507 Irelandgdpg 0.0034 
Germanygcf 0.0006 Italygdpg 0.1602 
Japangcf 0.0001 Portugalgdpg 0.2253 
Korea, Rep.gcf 0.0004 Spaingdpg 0 
Mexicogcf 0.0058 Worldexp 0.0245 
Argentinagcf 0 Chinaexp 0.162 
Brazilgcf 0.0089 United Kingdomexp 0.0108 
Chilegcf 0.1748 United Statesexp 0.0038 
Greecegcf 0.2375 Franceexp 0.1233 
Irelandgcf 0.0319 Germanyexp 0.0557 
Italygcf 0.0095 Japanexp 0 
Portugalgcf 0.1592 Korea, Rep.exp 0.0023 
Spaingcf 0.332 Mexicoexp 0.081 
Worldgniperc 0.7192 Argentinaexp 0.0479 
Chinagniperc 0.768 Brazilexp 0.073 
United Kingdomgniperc 0.3285 Chileexp 0.3792 
United Statesgniperc 0.0176 Greeceexp 0.6203 
Francegniperc 0.3853 Irelandexp 0.5382 
Germanygniperc 0.3763 Italyexp 0.5295 
Japangniperc 0.1964 Portugalexp 0.4947 
Korea, Rep.gniperc 0.0049 Spainexp no obs 
 
Ref : author made by the Dickey fuller test of countries’ variables extracted from the World Bank, 2014 
infconsumerp= inflation consumer prices, gsaving=gross savings, gcf=gross capital formation, 
gniperc=gni per capital ppp, gdpperc=gdp per capita, gdpg=gdp growth, exp=exports of goods and 
services 
  
       A clear understanding of empirical data about economic data requires 
reliability of raw data.  In supporting the assumption that export and debt 
sustainability are keys to get to the heart of questions relating to the economic growth, 
I mentioned them with the empirical angle because it provides the necessary 
background for discussing capital to GDP and further GDP analysis related to capital 
inequality. 
 
Debt management of Latin America 
 
Debt-driven capital 
 
In the 1960s and 1970s, Latin American countries, notably Brazil, Argentina, and 
Mexico, borrowed huge sums of money from international creditors for 
industrialization; especially infrastructure programs.  After 1973, private banks had 
an influx of funds from oil-rich countries and believed that sovereign debt was a safe 
investment.  Between 1975 and 1982, Latin American debt to commercial banks 
increased at a cumulative annual rate of 20.4 percent. This heightened borrowing led 
Latin America to quadruple its external debt from $75 billion in 1975 to more than 
$315 billion in 1983, or 50 percent of the region's gross domestic product (GDP). Debt 
service (interest payments and the repayment of principal) grew even faster, reaching 
$66 billion in 1982, up from $12 billion in 1975. 
 
Failure of debt-driven capital 
 
As interest rates increased in the United States of America and in Europe in 1979, debt 
payments also increased, making it harder for borrowing countries to pay back their 
debts.  Deterioration in the exchange rate with the US dollar meant that Latin 
American governments ended up owing tremendous quantities of their national 
currencies, as well as losing purchasing power.  The contraction of world trade in 
1981 caused the prices of primary resources (Latin America's largest export) to fall. 
       Argentina has until midnight on July 30, 2014 to avoid going into default for 
eight times in its history.  Most creditors exchanged their defaulted debt for new 
securities in two restructurings in 2005 and 2010 but a few creditors led by a hedge 
fund called NML Capital scooped up the cheap defaulted debt in order to chase 
payment of full principal plus interest.  If Argentina defaults, its outstanding debt 
under foreign law amounts will be $29 billion.   
 
Why capital cannot be simply explained within gross domestic production (GDP) : 
Attention to GDP replacing foreign imports – Import substitution industrialization (ISI) 
 
Import substitution industrialization (ISI) is a trade and economic policy that 
advocates replacing foreign imports with domestic production.  ISI policies were 
enacted by countries within the Global South with the intention of producing 
development and self-sufficiency through the creation of an internal market.  ISI 
works by having the state leading economic development through nationalization, 
subsidization of vital industries (including agriculture, power generation, etc.), 
increased taxation, and highly protectionist trade policies.  Import substitution 
industrialization was gradually abandoned by developing countries in the 1980s and 
1990s due to structural indebtedness from ISI related policies on the insistence of the 
IMF and World Bank through their structural adjustment programs of market-driven 
liberalization aimed at the Global South.   
       ISI was most successful in countries with large populations and income levels 
which allowed for the consumption of locally produced products. Latin American 
countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and (to a lesser extent) Chile, Uruguay 
and Venezuela, had the most success with ISI.  This is so because while the 
investment to produce cheap consumer products may pay off in a small consumer 
market, the same cannot be said for capital intensive industries, such as automobiles 
and heavy machinery, which depend on larger consumer markets to survive.  Thus, 
smaller and poorer countries, such as Ecuador, Honduras, and the Dominican Republic, 
could implement ISI only to a limited extent.  Peru implemented ISI in 1961, and the 
policy lasted through to the end of the decade in some forms. 
      By the early 1960s, domestic industry supplied 95% of Mexico’s and 98% of 
Brazil’s consumer goods.  Between 1950 and 1980, Latin America’s industrial output 
went up six times, keeping well ahead of population growth. Infant mortality fell from 
107 per 1,000 live births in 1960 to 69 per 1,000 in 1980 and life expectancy rose from 
52 to 64 years. In the mid of 1950s, Latin America’s economies were growing faster 
than those of the industrialized West. 
 
More to the immediate point why the GDP is not just the GDP to consider the capital 
inequality: example of Export-oriented industrialization (EOI) 
 
Export-oriented industrialization (EOI) sometimes called export substitution 
industrialization (ESI), export led industrialization (ELI) or export-led growth is a 
trade and economic policy aiming to speed up the industrialization process of a 
country by exporting goods for which the nation has a comparative advantage. 
      From the Great Depression to the years after World War II, under-developed 
and developing countries started to have the hard time economically.  During this 
time, many foreign markets were closed and the danger of trading and shipping in war-
time waters drove many of these countries to look for another solution to development.  
The initial solution to this dilemma was called import substitution industrialization. 
      Both Latin American and Asian countries used this strategy at first. However, 
during the 1950s and 1960s, Asian countries, like Taiwan and South Korea, started 
focusing their development outward, resulting in an export-led growth strategy.  Most 
of Latin American countries continued with import substitution industrialization, just 
expanding their scopes. Some have pointed that out because of the success of Asian 
countries, especially Taiwan and South Korea. 
 
Insolvent external debt of Latin America 
 
Since the 1980 several countries in the region have experienced a surge in economic 
development and have initiated debt management programs in addition to debt relief 
and debt rescheduling programs agreed to by their international creditors.  The 
following is a list of external debt for Latin America based on a 2012 report by The 
World Factbook. 
 
Table 5 External Debt for Latin America 
 
Rank Country – Entity 
External Debt 
(million US$) 
Date of information 
26 Brazil 405,300 31 December 2012. 
35 Argentina 130,200 31 December 2012. 
40 Mexico 125,700 31 December 2012 
45 Chile 102,100 31 December 2012. 
49 Colombia 73,410 31 December 2012. 
51 Venezuela 63,740 31 December 2012. 
63 Peru 4,200 31 December 2012. 
77 Cuba 22,160 31 December 2012. 
78 Ecuador 20,030 31 December 2012. 
81 Dominican Republic 16,580 31 December 2012. 
82 Guatemala 16,170 31 December 2012. 
83 Uruguay 15,900 31 December 2012. 
85 Panama 14,200 31 December 2012. 
86 El Salvador 12,840 31 December 2012. 
88 Costa Rica 12,040 31 December 2012. 
112 Nicaragua 5,228 31 December 2012. 
114 Honduras 4,884 31 December 2012. 
123 Bolivia 4,200 31 December 2012. 
139 Paraguay 2,245 31 December 2012. 
Ref: author, 2014 
 
Openness and External debt to exports ratio 
 
Debt burden indicators include the (a) Debt to gross domestic production (GDP) ratio, 
(b) External debt to exports ratio, (c) Government debt to current fiscal revenue ratio 
etc. This set of indicators also covers the structure of the outstanding debt including 
the (d) Share of foreign debt, (e) Short-term debt, and (f) Concessional debt in the total 
debt stock.
 
 
 
Table 6 : External Debt to Exports Ratio 
 
Country - Entity 
(million$)  
external debt exports Ratio (External debt/Exports) 
Brazil 405,300 242,000 1.674793388 
Argentina 130,200 85,360 1.525304592 
Mexico 125,700 370,900 0.338905365 
Chile 102,100 83,660 1.220415969 
Colombia 73,410 59,960 1.224316211 
Venezuela 63,740 96,900 0.657791538 
Peru 4,200 47,380 0.088644998 
Cuba 22,160 5,600 3.957142857 
Ecuador 20,030 23,770 0.842658814 
Dominican Republic 16,580 9,467 1.751346784 
Guatemala 16,170 9,864 1.639294404 
Uruguay 15,900 9,812 1.620464737 
Panama 14,200 17,970 0.790205899 
El Salvador 12,840 5,804 2.212267402 
Costa Rica 12,040 11,470 1.049694856 
Nicaragua 5,228 4,160 1.256730769 
Honduras 4,884 6,946 0.703138497 
Bolivia 4,200 11,770 0.356839422 
Paraguay 2,245 4,700 0.477659574 
Ref: world fact book, 2012 
 
    The ratio of gross external debt to exports provides a quick indicator of the 
capability of an economy to repay external debt with enhanced revenue from sales to 
foreign countries.  A ratio below 1 suggests that debt can be repaid rapidly, 
theoretically in less than one year.  Conversely, the higher the ratio is the lower the 
country’s capability to finance the debt with revenue from exports. 
    Having discussed the capital inequality issue, attention to the export variable 
and need of comprehensive ratio analysis: debt to export ratio and capital to income 
ratio, we will now proceed to investigate the risk management status of Latin America. 
 
Risk management in major Latin America countries: (Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, Chile) 
 
Among Latin America, the adoption of solvency II which is EU directive - codifies 
and harmonizes the EU insurance regulation primary concerning the amount of capital 
that EU insurance companies must hold to reduce the risk of insolvency- is realistic in 
Mexico.  In the second half of 2008, the Mexican regulator (Comisión Nacional de 
Seguros y Fianzas, or CNSF) shared with the Mexican association of insurance 
companies (Asociación Mexicana de Instituciones de Seguros, or AMIS) a draft of a 
project of insurance law (the proposed law) in which a Solvency II-type regime was 
incorporated.  The draft considered an initial date for this proposed law of January 
2012.  Since that time (end of 2008) through 2009 and the beginning of 2010, the 
proposed law was discussed and reviewed between CNSF and AMIS.  The actual 
initial date is January 2014.  However, the proposed law did not approved by the 
Mexican Congress. 
    If the strong solvency regulation is existed like Argentina, the conflict of two 
regulations between local solvency regulation and international one should be 
considered for the stable adoption.  The current framework does not seem to indicate 
that an extended application of the Solvency II methodology will be feasible in the 
near future, except for offices and branches of European–based insurance companies.  
    The regulatory agency, SSN (Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación) only 
mentioned the adoption of Solvency II without clear criteria.  Actually, the insurance 
industry is tightly regulated in Argentina.  SSN resolutions cover most aspects of 
insurance company activities, including unearned premiums and methods of 
mathematical reserve valuation.  The agency establishes minimum valuation methods 
arising from formulas used to value out-of-court, mediation and lawsuit payables, as 
well as incurred but not reported (IBNR) claims reserves.  Most insurance 
companies use these mechanisms to value their payables.  As of 30 June 2011 (last 
fiscal year-end), all insurance companies in the market calculated their capital to be 
credited based on the issued premiums indicator.  Of 155 insurers, only 4 carried 
minimum capital deficit as of this date.  In recent months, the SSN announced the 
launch of a strategic plan of insurance, inviting all industry participants to bring their 
vision to define the insurance policy to be used during the period 2012–2020.  
      The existence of many solvency regulations can be analyzed with the conflict 
inside rules in Brazil so the Own Risk and Solvency Assessment (ORSA) is needed to 
integrate them.  Brazil has adopted international regulations at each pillar.  For 
Pillar I, the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) as 
Brazilian generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) in 2010.  Detailed 
monthly reporting requirements of individual policy and claims data for the Insurance 
Supervisory Authority (Superintendência de Seguros Privados, SUSEP) were 
introduced in 2004 at the level of Pillar II.  In 2004, the Supervisory Authority 
introduced the requirement that each insurance company should produce an annual 
actuarial valuation report proper to Pillar III.  
    In Chile, A new law that would require insurance companies to withhold risk-
based capital was sent to Congress for approval on 30 September 2011.  The 
methodology for calculating risk-based capital in Chile has yet to be made public.  It 
is expected that the Chilean regulator will publish a consultative white paper with 
details around the calculation of risk-based capital in the third quarter of 2012.  The 
SVS (Superintendencia de Valores y Seguros) has demonstrated interest in performing 
the first Quantitative Impact Study (QIS) by the end of 2012.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
A capital-labor split of Cobb-Douglas function which continues to be widely used by 
economists, has little empirical support.  Even though neo-classical economists have 
proposed mathematical and theoretical realisms of economic growth by using the 
function, it was never empirically validated as the appropriate model for economic 
growth.  Indeed, Thomas Piketty, a French economist, brought up this debated topic 
about capital inequality in his book, Capital in the Twenty-First Century in 2014. 
     I agree with him in that there is the structure of inequality with respect to both 
labor and capital actually changed since the ninetieth century of the chapter: Beyond 
Cobb-Douglas “The Question of the Stability of the Capital-Labor Split.  Some 
research questions like “Did the Increase of inequality cause the financial crisis?”, 
“The illusion of marginal productivity”, “The Question of Time Preference” and “Is 
there an equilibrium distribution?” are fresh and fancy to break old fixed ideas. 
       I feel the solution is weak to support his brilliant idea enoughly.  At the part4, 
the talk is suddenly changed to tax and pension (PAYGOs) without connection with 
previous capital inequality.  Tax issues on Capital and Chinese millionaires are far 
from the real data of capital formation because it is very high value in China.  We 
cannot see any empirical data of China’s one in his book even though the major capital 
part is by China.  It seems hard to accept a solution of redistribution by immigration 
and an opinion about the central bank just as a loan deal before redistribution of 
wealth.  
      In the article, the most recent data shows that export and external debt may be 
correlated to explain economy growth.  In the paper, Latin America history pervades 
the claim that capital within GDP of Thomas Piketty should be enhanced by 
conceptual capital related to debt and export beyond GDP.  In addition, to point out 
miscalculation of ratio analysis depending on economic size, the example by Roubini, 
N. (2001) is demonstrated.  To conclude, through the case analysis of Latin America, 
in detail, economic size and debt sustainability as economic growth indicators are 
emphasized by empirical data. 
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